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Abstract
This paper analyses two central issues in exploitation theory. First,
t h ea p p r o p r i a t ed e ﬁnition of individual and aggregate measures of ex-
ploitation is discussed. Second, the relation between proﬁts and ex-
ploitation (the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem) is analysed.
A general framework for the analysis of exploitation in the context of
convex cone economies is proposed and various alternative equilibrium
concepts are discussed. The limits of subjectivist approaches to ex-
ploitation, which crucially depend on agents’ preferences, are shown.
An objectivist approach to exploitation, which is related to the so-
called ‘New Interpretation’ (Dumenil, 1980; Foley, 1982) is proposed.
It is argued that it captures the core intuitions of exploitation theory
and that it provides appropriate indices of individual and aggregate
exploitation. Further, it is shown that it preserves the Fundamental
Marxian Theorem in general economies.
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21 Introduction
The theory of exploitation is arguably the cornerstone of Marxian economics,
as it shows some crucial aspects of the relation between workers and capi-
talists in economies characterised by the private ownership of the means of
production. In general, workers are said to be exploited if the labour they
expend is higher than the amount of labour contained in a relevant bundle
(or set of bundles) of wage goods, which measures the value of labour power.
Even in stylised two-class societies, though, it has proved surprisingly diﬃ-
cult to provide a fully satisfactory and rigorous theory of exploitation outside
the standard simpliﬁed Leontief economy. First of all, outside the Leontief
economy without joint production, with homogeneous labour, and with sub-
sistence wages, the very deﬁnition of exploitation is ambiguous. In fact, the
appropriate deﬁnition of the value of labour power is not obvious, and in-
deed a number of deﬁn i t i o n sh a v eb e e np r o p o s e d( s e e[ 2 0 ]a n d[ 2 2 ] ,f o ra
discussion). In turn, this implies that the deﬁnition of the appropriate ex-
ploitation index, measuring the amount of exploitation in the economy, is
not uncontroversial. This issue seems central because a proper theory of ex-
ploitation should arguably be able to compare diﬀerent societies in terms of
their exploitation levels, but also to analyse an economy, and its exploitation
structure, over time. Secondly, and relatedly, outside the Leontief setting,
it is not trivial to prove that the core insights and propositions of exploita-
tion theory hold. For example, the Marxian claim that labour is the source
of exploitation has been challenged, because in more general economies, a
number of counterexamples to the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem
(hereafter, FMT) have been produced. In standard Marxist approaches, this
is also an important issue since the FMT proves that exploitation is synoni-
mous with positive proﬁts (and thus with capitalist relations of production).
Actually, the relevance of the FMT is such that although it is proved as
a result, its epistemological status is that of a postulate: the appropriate
deﬁnition of exploitation, and of an exploitation index, is considered to be
one which preserves the FMT. Indeed, a number of alternative deﬁnitions
of exploitation, and exploitation indices, have been proposed precisely in an
attempt to generalise the FMT to economies with joint production, heteroge-
nous labour, etc.,1 and alternative deﬁnitions have been evaluated in terms
1See, among the others, [8]; [9]; [4]; [11]; [12]; [2]. For more recent debates on the FMT,
see also [14], [15], and [21].
3of their ability to preserve the FMT.2
In line with Marx’s own approach, the main approaches to exploitation
theory proposed in the literature have endorsed an objectivist perspective
by deﬁning exploitation in relation to the objective features of an economy
(including data on production, consumption, labour supply, etc.), with no
reference to agents’ individual attitudes, beliefs, and subjective preferences.
In a recent contribution, instead, [6] has proposed an original and thought-
provoking subjectivist theory of exploitation, in which agents’ preferences
play a deﬁnitional role alongside the objective features (related to production
and distribution) of the economy. In this approach, workers are exploited
if and only if there is a bundle of goods that they weakly prefer to the
bundle of wage goods they receive and that can be produced with less labour
than they have expended. According to [6], this deﬁnition of exploitation is
superior to alternative approches to the FMT. In particular, it can deal with
counterexamples such as those constructed by Petri ([10]) and Roemer ([11],
[12]) against Morishima’s ([8], [9]) famous deﬁnition of exploitation, which
show that in economies with joint production it is possible to have positive
proﬁts with no exploitation.
This paper thoroughly analyses the subjectivist approach and it com-
pares it with the standard objectivist view, focusing in particular on the
appropriate deﬁnition of an exploitation index and on the FMT. A general
framework for the analysis of exploitation in the context of convex cone
economies is proposed. First of all, the subjectivist approach to exploita-
tion is analysed. On the one hand, the main characterisation result (the
Weak System of Exploitation Theory) is signiﬁcantly generalised to a convex
economy with heterogeneous agents. On the other hand, it is shown that
under diﬀerent concepts of equilibrium, the FMT does not hold and thus,
contrary to Matsuo’s claim, the subjectivist approach does not solve the
problems of traditional theories of exploitation. Furthermore, although no
precise subjectivist exploitation index is provided, the properties of a class of
subjectivist indices which satisfy two weak axioms are explored. Two rather
counterintuitive implications of the subjectivist view are proved: ﬁrst, even
if the objective productive and distributive conditions of the economy are
2It is worth noting that Roemer ([13]) suggested that the Class-Exploitation Corre-
spondence Principle - according to which agents in the lower classes are exploited and
agents in the upper classes are exploiters - enjoys the same epistemological status as the
FMT in Marxian economics. See also [20] and [22], which prove that under the received
deﬁnitions of exploitation, the CECP does not hold in general convex cone economies.
4unchanged, a subjectivist exploitation index will vary except in a very small
set of economies. Second, there exist economies in which, given the same
set of objective data, the exploitation index can take virtually any value in
between 0 and 1, unless the set of preferences is restricted.
Secondly, a rigorous axiomatic deﬁnition of an objectivist exploitation in-
dex is provided, by requiring that if two economies diﬀer only in the agents’
individual characteristics (preference proﬁles), then exploitation should be
the same in both of them. This is a very weak requirement to deﬁne ob-
jectivism, as it allows, for instance, workers’ preferences to matter in the
choice of their consumption bundle and thus, in principle, in the deﬁnition of
the value of labour power. Then, an objectivist deﬁnition of exploitation is
analysed, which is conceptually related to the so-called ‘New Interpretation’
([1]; [3]; see [7], for a recent survey) and it is proved that it preserves the
FMT in general convex economies. Although the paper focuses on Marxian
exploitation theory, the discussion should be of interest for non-Marxists, too,
because of the interesting positive and normative insights that the notion of
exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour provides.
2 The General Model
In this section, a general framework for the analysis of exploitation is provided
along the lines of Roemer ([11], [12]), which allows for a general convex
cone technology, rather than the standard von Neumann framework often
used in exploitation theory. This is not just for the sake of formalism: the
diﬀerences between alternative approaches to exploitation and the anomalies
in the relation between proﬁts and exploitation become relevant when the
linear production model is abandoned.
2.1 Production
In the economy there are n produced commodities and one non-produced
good, namely labour. Let 0 ∈ Rn be such that 0 =( 0 ,...,0). Let P be
the production set: P h a se l e m e n t so ft h ef o r mα =( −α0,−α,α) where
α0 ∈ R+ , α ∈ Rn
+ ,a n dα ∈ Rn
+ . Thus, elements of P are vectors in R2n+1.
The ﬁrst component, −α0, is the direct labour input of the process α;t h e
next n components, −α, are the inputs of goods used in the process; and
the last n components, α, are the outputs of the n goods from the process.
5The net output vector arising from α is denoted as b α ≡ α − α. The set P is
assumed to be a closed convex cone containing the origin in R2n+1.M o r e o v e r ,
it is assumed that:3
Assumption (A1). ∀α ∈ P s.t. α0 ≥ 0 and α = 0, [α ≥ 0 ⇒ α0 > 0];
Assumption (A2). ∀ c ∈ Rn
+ , ∃α ∈ P s.t. b α = c;
Assumption (A3). ∀α ∈ P, ∀(α0,α0) ∈ Rn
+ × Rn
+ ,
[(−α0,α0) 5 (−α,α) ⇒ (−α0,−α0,α0) ∈ P].
A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative output
vector; A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as a
net output; and A3 is a free disposal condition for the production possibility
set, which states that, given any feasible production process α,a n yv e c t o r
producing (weakly) less net output than α is also feasible using the same
amount of labour as α itself.
Given P, the following notation is used:
P (α0 = l) ≡ {(−α0,−α,α) ∈ P | α0 = l},
b P (α0 = l) ≡ {b α ∈ R
n | ∃α =( −l,−α,α) ∈ P s.t. α − α = b α},
S b P (α0 = l) ≡
n
b α ∈ b P (α0 = l) | @b α
0 ∈ b P (α0 = l) s.t. b α
0 ≥ b α
o
,
where P (α0 = l) is the set of production vectors which use l units of labour as
an input, b P (α0 = l) is the corresponding set of net outputs, and S b P (α0 = l)
is the set of net outputs that can be produced eﬃciently using exactly l units
of labour. Further, for any set S ⊆ Rn, the set ∂S ≡ {x ∈ S | @x0 ∈ S s.t. x0 >x }
is the frontier of S and
◦
S≡ S\∂S is its interior.
The von Neumann model with joint production (analysed, among the
others, by [6]) is a special case of the convex cone technology. Let A be an
n×m non-negative matrix with input coeﬃcients aij = 0 for any i =1 ,...,n,
j =1 ,...,m,a n dB be an n×m non-negative matrix with output coeﬃcients
bij = 0 for any i =1 ,...,n, j =1 ,...,m.M o r e o v e r , l e t L be a positive
1 × m vector with labour input coeﬃcients Lj > 0 for any j =1 ,...,m.T o
3For all vectors x =( x1,...,x n) and y =( y1,...,y n) ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi
(i =1 ,...,n); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i
(i =1 ,...,n).
6be precise, the von Neumann economy is a particular type of P, denoted as
P(A,B,L), which can be described as follows
P(A,B,L) ≡
©




+ | ∃x ∈ R
m
+ : α0 = Lx & (−α,α) 5 (−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
This P(A,B,L) is a closed convex cone in R− × Rn
− × Rn
+ with 0 ∈ P(A,B,L).
Moreover, P(A,B,L) is easily shown to satisfy Assumptions 1-3.
2.2 Agents
In the standard two-class model used to analyse the FMT, the economy
consists of a set K of capitalists and of a set W of workers. The set of agents
N, with generic element ν,i st h e r e f o r eg i v e nb yN = K∪W. To be speciﬁc,
let ων ∈ Rn
+ denote the vector of initial productive endowments of agent
ν ∈ N: the working class W is the set of agents with no initial endowments,
while the capitalist class K is the set of agents endowed with some non-
negative and non-zero amount of inputs. Thus, W = {ν ∈ N : ων = 0} and
K = {ν ∈ N : ων ≥ 0}.4
Each capitalist can operate any activity of the technology P and is as-
sumed to maximise proﬁts. For the sake of simplicity, capitalists are also
assumed to save all revenues, which are invested in the next production pe-
riod, and to supply no labour (e.g., they can be assumed to derive inﬁnite
disutility from labour). Each worker is endowed with one unit of labour,
which is assumed to be homogenous - there is no skill heterogenity among
workers.5 For the sake of simplicity, it is also assumed that, for a given ag-
gregate amount of (homogeneous) labour supplied, each worker works the
same amount of time and gets the same amount of goods. Therefore, if bν
denotes the wage basket of worker ν and lν denotes the labour performed by
ν, the latter assumption implies that bν = b and lν = l,a l lν. It is assumed
that b ∈ Rn
+ .
4In principle, one might argue that the appropriate deﬁnition of workers and capitalists
relates to their ﬁnancial wealth, rather than their vector of endowments. If this view is
adopted, then W = {ν ∈ N : pων =0 } and K = {ν ∈ N : pων > 0}. This distinction is
relevant only if p ≯ 0 and it does not make any signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the results of this
paper.
5The presence of heterogeneous labour does raise important issues in exploitation the-
ory, including on the relation between exploitation and proﬁts (for a discussion, see, e.g.,
[4]). Yet, this issue is not relevant in the comparison between objectivist and subjectivist
approaches, which is the central theme of this paper. In his subjectivist approach to
exploitation, [6] also assumes homogeneous labour (see Assumption 3).
7Given the above behavioural assumptions, a complete description of an
economy should be given by a list hK,W;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki. In a subjectivist
framework, such as the one proposed by [6], however, the complete descrip-
tion of an economy requires also the speciﬁcation of the agents’ (more pre-
cisely, the workers’) utility functions, even if they are not essential to analyse
agents’ behaviour. Thus, for every agent ν ∈ W,l e tuν : R
n+1
+ → R be the
utility function representing worker ν’s preferences over consumption and
leisure: a convex cone economy is given by a list E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki,
and the set of all such convex cone economies is denoted as E.
Given a market economy, any price system is denoted by p ∈ Rn
+ ,w h i c h
gives one price for each of the n commodities. Moreover, the nominal wage
rate is assumed to be positive and equal to unity.
3 A Subjectivist Approach to Exploitation
In a subjectivist approach, the introduction of agents’ preferences in the
description of an economy is not only for completeness, nor does it play a
merely subsidiary role (e.g., in determining their actual consumption and
leisure choices): utility functions play a central - indeed, deﬁnitional - role,
in the analysis of exploitation. Consider ﬁrst the deﬁnition of labour values
and the value of labour power. [6] deﬁnes the labour value of a vector b
referring to the notion of Minimised Labour for Equal Utility (MLEU): the
labour value of bundle b corresponds to the minimum amount of labour
necessary to produce another bundle c as net output, which gives at least
the same utility as b. Formally, let C denote the set of continuous functions.
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, assume that leisure
does not enter the workers’ utility functions, so that for every agent ν ∈ W,
uν : Rn
+ → R is the utility function representing worker ν’s preferences over
consumption. The equivalent of Matsuo’s ([6]) Assumption 2 in a general
framework with heterogeneous agents can then be written as follows.6
6Leisure is not included in utility functions for notational simplicity and conceptual
clarity. First, although [6] assumes that workers have preferences over leisure, this assump-
tion plays no role at all in his argument and indeed he imposes no restriction whatsoever
concerning the eﬀect of leisure on welfare. Second, if leisure is included in the utility
function some conceptual issues arise concerning the deﬁnition of labour value (see the
next footnote). Finally, the introduction of leisure in the utility functions would leave all
the theoretical arguments and formal results in this paper unchanged.
8Assumption 4: For every ν ∈ W, uν ∈ U,w h e r eU = {uν ∈ C|c0 ≥ c ⇒
uν(c0) >u ν(c)}.
In other words, each worker’s utility function is continuous and strictly
increasing (in the ﬁrst n arguments).
Deﬁnition 1: For a given uν ∈ U, the labour value of vector b according to













Let us denote the solution of the above problem by αuν (b): the labour
value of b w.r.t. uν is deﬁned as αuν
0 (b).7 Two crucial properties of the
subjectivist deﬁnition of the labour content of a bundle b are immediately
apparent from Deﬁnition 1: ﬁrst, the concept of labour value depends on
subjective preferences, and if agents are heterogenous in principle there is
no unique value of b.8 Second, in this approach, the notion of labour value
becomes more and more abstract and far from the productive conditions of
the economy.
It is now possible to specify the subjectivist notion of exploitation of an
agent ν.
Deﬁnition 2: Given a utility function uν ∈ U, worker ν ∈ W, working
l =1 , is exploited w.r.t. uν in the sense of Minimised labour for Equal
Utility (uν-MLEU) if and only if 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0. Further, worker ν ∈ W,
working l =1 , is exploited in the sense of Minimised Labour for Equal Utility
(MLEU) if and only if 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0 holds for all uν ∈ U.
7In [6] leisure is included in workers’ utility functions, which are also assumed to be
identical, and thus the relevant constraint in ML is written as u(c,l) ≥ u(b,l),w h e r e
l is the amount of labour expended by workers to be able to buy b. As already noted,
the inclusion of labour has no relevance for the formal results. Yet, from a theoretical
viewpoint, it seems arbitrary to keep labour constant at l in the left-hand-side of the
constraint. It is not at all clear why the amount of labour in workers’ utility functions
should remain constant even at the new allocation c.
8Interestingly, in the economy with P = P(A,B,L), Matsuo ([6], Deﬁnition 3) deﬁnes
a “Narrow Eﬀective Range of Value” as the set of strictly positive vectors t such that
t(B − A) 5 L.T h ev e c t o r st seem the generalisation of the standard vector of embodied
labour t = L(I − A)−1 of the Leontief technology, and they only depend on the objective
features of the economy relating to the conditions of production. In this framework, it
w o u l dt h e ns e e mn a t u r a lt od e ﬁne the labour value of a bundle c as tc.Y e tt h e yp l a yn o
essential role in Matsuo’s ([6]) analysis.
9An important feature of Deﬁnition 2 should be noted, in order to clarify
the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist notions of exploitation.
Because the condition in Deﬁnition 2 must hold for all functions uν ∈ U,
and the existence of exploitation is proved regardless of the speciﬁc functional
form of uν (subject to a proviso, to be speciﬁed below), Matsuo maintains
that “This causes this condition to be objective” ([6], p.260). This claim
is rather misleading: although the existence of exploitation is independent
of the speciﬁc utility function (provided it belongs to U), the actual labour
value of a bundle does depend on the speciﬁc uν (thus, for instance, the value
of labour power cannot be deﬁned unless uν is known).
If workers are not homogeneous, the inherently subjective dimension of
Matsuo’s approach, and its implications, are particularly clear when the con-
struction of an aggregate index of exploitation in the economy is consid-
ered. In fact, a speciﬁc problem of subjectivist approaches with heteroge-
nous agents concerns the aggregation of the individual exploitation indices
into an aggregate measure, even if all workers consume the same bundle,a s
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent ways of aggregating the αuν
0 (b)’s seem reasonable. One
possibility might be to use the average labour value of the common bundle
b.
Deﬁnition 3: For a given (uν)ν∈W,s u c ht h a tuν ∈ U for all ν, the (economy-
wide) labour value of vector b according to the Minimised Labour for Equal










Yet, this is certainly not the only way of aggregating labour values, and
thus some theoretical ambiguity seems inherent in the subjectivist approach.
Some of these problems disappear if one assumes, as in [6], that all work-
ers have identical preferences. If a representative agent is assumed in this








+ : u(c) ≥ u(b)
¢
.
Given ML, the deﬁnition of individual and aggregate exploitation can be
changed accordingly.
Deﬁnition 4: Given a welfare function u ∈ U, every worker ν ∈ W is
exploited w.r.t. u in the sense of Minimised Labour for Equal Utility (u-
MLEU) if and only if 1 − αu
0 (b) > 0. Every worker ν ∈ W is exploited
10in the sense of Minimised Labour for Equal Utility (MLEU) if and only if
1 − αu
0 (b) > 0 holds for all u ∈ U.
According to [6], exploitation essentially derives from the workers’ lack
of control over production processes, and that if workers could access all
production processes, they would not be exploited and they would be able to
reach a higher utility. Therefore, in addition to the minimisation programme




ν (b α) s.t. b α ∈ R
n
+ and α0 5 1.
The solution of the above problem can be denoted by αuν
max, and its corre-
sponding utility value by uuν
max. If a representative agent is assumed, then the
latter reduce to αu
max and uu
max, respectively.
Given c ∈ Rn
+ and uν ∈ U, let the upper contour set of uν at c be given
by U (c;uν) ≡
©
c0 ∈ Rn
+ | uν (c0) >u ν (c)
ª
. The following results generalise
Matsuo’s ([6]) ‘Weak System of the Exploitation Theory’ in two important
directions: ﬁrst, it allows for heterogenous workers’ preferences; second, all of
the equivalence results are shown to hold in general convex cone economies.
This generalised result is interesting in its own right, but also because - thanks
to an arguably simpler and more transparent proof - it forcefully highlights
some implications of a subjective approach to exploitation theory.
Theorem 1 (The Generalised Weak System of Exploitation Theory): For
any economy E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki ∈ E, the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(1) b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) ;
(2) For each ν ∈ W, 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0 holds for all uν ∈ U;
(3) For each ν ∈ W, uν (b) < uuν
max holds for all uν ∈ U;
(4) @p ∈ Rn
++ s.t. p[b α − b] 5 0 holds for any b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) .
Proof. 1. First, we prove that (1)⇔(2).
(⇐):L e tb ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, by deﬁnition of b P (α0 =1 ) ,
it needs at most one unit of labour to produce b as a net output. Since
b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) ,t h e r ee x i s t sα ∈ P such that b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )
and b α ≥ b. Then, for any uν ∈ U, uν (b α) >u ν (b) holds. Then, we can
ﬁnd c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )such that b α ≥ c ≥ b. Then, again, for any
uν ∈ U, uν (c) >u ν (b) holds, which implies that c ∈∩ uν∈UU (b;uν).N o t e
11that, since U (b;uν) is an open set for each uν, ∩uν∈UU (b;uν) is also open.
This implies that there is an open neighbourhood N (c) of c such that N (c) ⊆
∩uν∈UU (b;uν).T h u s ,t h e r ei sc0 ∈
◦
b P (α0 =1 )such that c0 ∈∩ uν∈UU (b;uν).
Note that c0 ∈
◦
b P (α0 =1 )implies there exists α0 ∈ P such that α0 − α0 ≥ c0
and α0
0 < 1.T h u s ,s i n c euν (c0) >u ν (b) holds for any uν ∈ U,i tf o l l o w sf r o m
Deﬁnition 2 that 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0 holds for all uν ∈ U.
(⇒):S u p p o s e b ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists a suitable uν ∈ U
which satisﬁes U (b;uν)∩ b P (α0 =1 )=∅. This implies, by the continuity of
uν, αuν
0 (b)=1 . Suppose b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, again, there exists a suitable
uν ∈ U which satisﬁes U (b;uν)∩ b P (α0 =1 )=∅, which implies αuν
0 (b) = 1.
2. Next, we prove that (1) ⇔ (3).
(⇐):L e tb ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, for any uν ∈ U,t h e r ee x i s t s
cuν ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )such that uν ¡
cuν¢
>u ν (b) holds. Note, for any uν ∈ U,
uuν
max = uν ¡
cuν¢
holds. Thus, for any uν ∈ U, uν (b) < uuν
max.
(⇒):S u p p o s e b ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists a suitable uν ∈ U
such that uuν
max = uν (b). Suppose b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists a
suitable uν ∈ U which satisﬁes U (b;uν) ∩ b P (α0 =1 )=∅,w h i c hi m p l i e s
uν (b) = uuν
max.
3. Finally, we prove that (1) ⇔ (4).
(⇒):L e tb ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists α ∈ P such
that b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )and b α ≥ b. Then, for any p ∈ Rn
++ , p[b α − b] > 0
holds.
(⇐): Suppose that for any p ∈ Rn
++ ,t h e r ee x i s t sb α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )
such that p[b α − b] > 0 holds. If b ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) , it implies there exists
p ∈ Rn
++ such that for any b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) , p[b α − b] 5 0 holds, which is a
contradiction. If b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) , then by the separating hyperplane theorem,
there exists p∗ ∈ Rn such that for any b α ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) , p∗ [b α − b] < 0 holds.
By A3, b P (α0 =1 )is a comprehensive set, and b P (α0 =1 )∩Rn
+ 6= ∅ by A2.
Since b ∈ Rn
+ , b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 )implies that there exists b α
0 ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 ) ∩Rn
+
such that b ≥ b α
0, which implies that p∗ ∈ Rn
+. Then, if p∗ / ∈ Rn
++ ,l e tu s
take another p0 ∈ Rn
++ which is suﬃciently close to p∗. Then, p0 [b α − b] < 0
still holds for all b α ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) ,s i n c ep[b α − b] is continuous at p∗ for each
b α ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) . Thus, a contradiction obtains.
In other words, Theorem 1 proves that, whatever the actual preferences
12of workers (provided they can be represented with a continuous and strictly
increasing utility function), every worker in the economy is exploited in the
sense of MLEU if and only if it is possible to produce her consumption bundle
with less labour than she has supplied. Similarly, whatever their actual pref-
erences, workers do not get their maximum utility if and only if it is possible
to produce her consumption bundle with less labour than she has supplied.
Thus, the generalisation of the Weak System of Exploitation Theory shows
that the complicated formal machinery deployed by Matsuo ([6]) hides an
arguably unsurprising intuition: in the subjectivist approach workers are ex-
ploited at an allocation if there is an alternative feasible allocation that gives
them a higher welfare. But then, given the assumption on monotonicity,
and given that capitalists play no role in the economy (and their welfare is
irrelevant), workers are exploited if and only if they do not get the whole net
product. This is hardly surprising.
The next results derive Matsuo’s main Theorem as a Corollary of Theorem
1 above, in the special case of von Neumann technology:
Corollary 1: For any economy hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki with P =
P(A,B,L) for some (A,B,L), the following statements are equivalent:
(1) @p ∈ Rn
++ s.t. p[B − A − bL] 5 0;
(2) ∃x ∈ Rm
+ s.t. [B − A − bL]x ≥ 0;
(3) For each ν ∈ W, 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0 holds for all uν ∈ U;
(4) For each ν ∈ W, uν (b) < uuν
max holds for all uν ∈ U.
Theorem 1, and Corollary 1, do establish some core results of the sub-
jectivist approach to exploitation, but they do not provide fully satisfactory
answers to two central issues of exploitation theory. Firstly, they provide
little guidance as to the appropriate deﬁnition of an exploitation index.
If agents are heterogenous, the individual index of exploitation of worker




l . As already noted, though, there is no obvious way of





, unless a representative worker is assumed. But
then, it is important to stress that in this context, the representative agent
assumption is arguably not just an innocuous technical condition. Secondly,
also Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 do not fully characterise the relation between
exploitation and proﬁts in a general way.





to satisfy the following two reasonable properties:






In other words, if every worker is exploited, then the aggregate exploitation
index must be positive, too.






The second axiom states that if workers are identical, then the aggregate
index coincides with the individual index of a representative worker.
Axioms 1 and 2 are by no means exhaustive, and a number of other
c o n d i t i o n sm a yb ei m p o s e d( f o re x a m p l e ,o n em a ya r g u et h a ti ti ss u ﬃcient
for one worker to be exploited for aggregate exploitation to exist). Yet,
Axioms 1 and 2 are all that is necessary for the purposes of this paper, and in
particular to derive the next result, which establishes that, in the subjectivist
approach, if proﬁts are positive, then the economy is exploitative.
Proposition 1: Assume Axiom 1.F o ra n ye c o n o m yE = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki
∈ E ,i f((p,1),α) i sap a i ro fan o n - n e g a t i v en o n - z e r op r i c ea n das o c i a lp r o -





0 for any (uν)ν∈W such that uν ∈ U for all ν ∈ W.
Proof. Let ((p,1),α) be a price vector and a social production point such
that b α = α0b and pb α − α0 > 0.L e t α∗ ≡ α/α0. Then, pb α
∗ − 1 > 0
and b α
∗ = b.B y d e ﬁnition, b α
∗ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) .S i n c e b α
∗ = b, it follows that
b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )or b α
∗ = b.S i n c epb α
∗ − 1 > 0 for pb =1 , b α
∗ = b
is impossible, so that b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )holds. By Theorem 1 and
Axiom 1, the desired result is obtained.
A ﬁrst problem of the Weak System of Exploitation Theory can now be
noted. Corollary 1 cannot exclude the case that p[B − A − bL] 5 0 holds
for some p ≥ 0 even when condition (3) holds. Therefore, if p ≥ 0,i tm a y
well happen that exploitation occurs without positive proﬁts, contradicting
t h eF M T .T h i si sn o tam i n o ri s s u e ,a st h e r ea r em a n yc a s e si nw h i c hm a r k e t
equilibrium holds with p ≥ 0 solely, and there is no obvious explanation which
14permits us to focus solely on resource allocations with positive price vectors.
The next section proves that this is not an abstract possibility and the FMT
is indeed violated under two rather standard equilibrium deﬁnitions.
4 The subjectivist approach and the FMT
The Weak System of Exploitation Theory is only a system of equivalences and
it holds whatever the equilibrium notion adopted for this economy. Indeed,
Theorem 1 does not seem restricted to equilibrium allocations, whatever the
concept of equilibrium adopted. In order to provide a more precise framework
for the analysis of exploitation theory and the FMT, and also to illustrate
the problems of the subjectivist view, though, it is opportune to deﬁne the
notion of equilibrium in this economy. At least two types of equilibrium
notions can be considered in this economic model.
Consider, ﬁrst, von Neumann’s concept of balanced growth equilibrium.
Assume wages to be advanced and let pb =1 .
Deﬁnition 5 [[18]]: A balanced growth equilibrium (BGE) for the economy
E ∈ E with P = P(A,B,L) is a tuple ((p,1),x,π),w h e r ep ∈ Rn
+ , x ∈ Rm
+ ,
and π > −1 such that:
(a) pB 5 (1 + π)[pA + L];
(b) Bx = (1 + π)[A + bL]x;
(c) pBx > 0.
In Deﬁnition 5, (a) is the revenue-cost condition for each production process
in equilibrium, which implies that, given competitition among production
processes, in equilibrium no capitalist can gain more than the warranted
proﬁtr a t eπ from operating any production process. Note that the warranted
proﬁtr a t eπ is the minimal value of the (uniform) proﬁtr a t ew a r r a n t e df o r
all production processes in equilibrium. In contrast, (b) is the demand and
supply condition for each capital and/or consumption good, which implies
that in the equilibrium, the demand of any capital or consumption goods
used for the next production period, (1 + π)[A + bL]x, does not exceed the
supply of those goods, Bx,p r o d u c e di nt h i sp e r i o d .H e r e ,π represents the
maximum growth rate of the economy. Finally, condition (c) implies that
the total market value of output should be positive, which eliminates trivial
equilibria with no production.
15The next result proves that the Fundamental Marxian Theorem does not
hold under either Deﬁnition 3 or Deﬁnition 4, in the von Neumann balanced
growth equilibrium.
Theorem 2: There is an economy E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki
∈ E with P = P(A,B,L) in which for any balanced growth equilibrium, its
corresponding warranted proﬁtr a t eis zero while exploitation exists in the
sense of both Deﬁnitions 3 and 4.
Proof. Consider a von Neumann production technology (A,B,L) and a

















In this case, regardless of the distribution of capital endowment (ων)ν∈K,t h e
















To show this, let p =( 0 ,1). Then, since p[B − A]=( 1 ,1) and πpA +
(1 + π)L = π(1,1) + (1 + π)(1,1), the warranted proﬁtr a t ea tt h i sp r i c ei s
















, it follows from Deﬁnition 5(b) that π =0
holds. Thus, if ((p,1),x,π) ∈ BGE(A,B,L,b),t h e ni tc o n s t i t u t e saB G E .
Let us examine whether there is another BGE. By the above argument, if





2) and π00p00A+(1+π00)L =( 1 ,1).S i n c ep00
1+p00
2 =1by pb =
1, it follows that p00 [B − A]=( 1 ,p 00
1 +1 ) .T h u s ,i f((p00,1),x 00,π00) constitutes
aB G E ,p00
1 =0holds from Deﬁnition 5(a). Therefore, if ((p00,1),x 00,π00) con-
stitutes a BGE, then ((p00,1),x 00,π00) ∈ BGE(A,B,L,b).
The above argument implies that in this economy, the warranted proﬁt
rate is zero at every BGE. Hence, if either Deﬁnition 3 or Deﬁnition 4 is
adopted and the FMT holds in this economy, then there should be no ex-
ploitation in the sense of Deﬁnition 3 or 4. However, recalling that P(A,B,L) ≡ ©
(−α0,−α,α) ∈ R− × Rn
− × Rn
+ | ∃x ∈ Rm



































∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Hence, by Theorem 1,
for any uν ∈ U, 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0.T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h eF M Td o e sn o th o l d
in this economy if exploitation is given by Deﬁnition 3. Using Theorem 1, a
similar argument proves that there exists exploitation according to Deﬁnition
4.
In other words, if the notion of BGE is adopted, the FMT does not hold
as a general result if the subjectivist approach is endorsed. The problems of
the subjectivist approach, however, are not speciﬁct ot h eB G E .C o n s i d e ra
diﬀerent equilibrium concept, namely that of reproducible solution proposed
by Roemer ([11];[12]). It is assumed that capitalists maximise proﬁts, sub-
ject to the constraint that they must be able to layout the operating costs
of capital in advance, whereas wages are paid out at the end of the produc-
tion process. Formally, assuming stationary expectations on prices ([11];[12],
Chapter 2), capitalist ν’s program is given by:
choose α








The set of production processes that are the optimal solutions of the
above problem is denoted by Aν (p,w). Then:
Deﬁnition 6 [[11];[12], Chapter 2]: A reproducible solution (RS) for an




,w h e r ep ∈ Rn
+ and αν ∈ P,
such that:
(a) ∀ν ∈ K, αν ∈ Aν (p,1) (proﬁt maximisation);
(b) b α = α0b (reproducibility),
where b α ≡
P




(c) α 5 ω (availability of capital), where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν and ω ≡
P
ν∈K ων;
(d) pb =1(subsistence wage).
In other words, at a RS, (a) capitalists maximise proﬁts; (b) aggregat out-
put is suﬃcient to replace capital used up and for workers’ consumption,
and (c) aggregate capital is suﬃcient for production plans. Part (d) is the






ν∈W lν 5 |W| (which is a standard assumption in Marx-
ian economics).9
The next theorem proves that if a subjectivist deﬁnition of exploitation
is adopted, the FMT does not hold at a RS of the economy.
Theorem 3: There is an economy E ∈ E such that at a RS the maximal
proﬁtr a t eis zero,w h i l eexploitation exists in the sense of both Deﬁnitions
3a n d4 .
Proof. Consider the same von Neumann production technology (A,B,L)
and the same bundle of wage goods b as in the proof of Theorem 2. Let





,a l lν ∈ K,s ot h a t
P






Assume that |K| ≤ |W|. First, it is not diﬃcult to prove that p =( 0 ,1) is
a competitive equilibrium price for this economy. In fact, it is immediate to










then xν ∈ Aν (p,1), for all ν ∈ K,w i t hAxν = ων, (B − A)xν = b,
and Lxν =1 ,a l lν ∈ K. Therefore, noting that |K| ≤ |W|, it follows
that
P
ν∈K Lxν ≤ |W|,
P
ν∈K (B − A)xν =
P




ν∈K ων. Second, because b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) , the desired result
follows from Theorem 1.
Theorems 2 and 3 raise serious doubts concerning the subjectivist ap-
proach to Marxian exploitation, and its relation with the FMT. Matsuo pro-
posed the subjectivist approach precisely in order to rescue Marxian exploita-
tion theory from the counterexample in [10], which shows that the FMT does
not hold under Morishima’s ([9]) deﬁnition of exploitation. In particular,
Petri’s counterexample shows that although Morishima’s ([9]) Generalised
F M Ti sr o b u s ti naB G E ,t h eF M Td o e sn o th o l di ng e n e r a li fa n o t h e re q u i -
librium notion, such as RS, or if disequilibria are considered: it is possible to
have positive proﬁts without exploitation in the sense of [9]. [6] shows that
Petri’s counterexample can be resolved if Deﬁnition 3 is adopted instead of
Morishima’s ([9]). In fact, for any price vector, if proﬁts are positive, then
exploitation in the sense of Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 always exists. This is not
really a solution of Petri’s puzzle, however, because, as shown in Theorem
2, if Matsuo’s approach is adopted, the FMT cannot hold even at a BGE.
9For a more detailed discussion of the notion of Reproducible Solution, see [11], [12]
(Chapter 2), and [20].
18From this perspective, the subjectivist approach seems to score worse than
Morishima’s deﬁnition, rather than solving its diﬃculties.
5 The subjectivist index of exploitation
The argument developed in the previous section provides a criticism of the
subjectivist approach from an analytical point of view, and so it would apply
even if Deﬁnition 3 or 4 above were deemed appropriate formulations of ex-
ploitation. There are, however, some theoretical arguments against Matsuo’s
notion of exploitation. In particular, it may be argued that in a subjectivist
approach the concept of exploitation loses conceptual clarity and analytical
strength.
First of all, even setting aside the doubts related to Theorems 2 and 3
above, the claims concerning the generality of the results are unwarranted,
even if a representative worker is assumed. Although the class of utility
functions in U is rather large, some important cases are excluded (for in-
stance, perfect complements, lexicographic preferences, neutral goods), and
this exclusion is puzzling if the motivation of the whole exercise is to pro-
vide a general framework that avoids counterexamples to the FMT: given
the restrictions on U,i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to build new counterexamples using
utility functions outside U. For instance, if preferences are perfect comple-
ments, then the equivalence result breaks down. So, if the approach is to be
defended, this is not on the grounds of its presumed generality. One would
have to argue directly that it is theoretically superior.
Matsuo defends the strict monotonicity assumption against one speciﬁc
critique, namely against the claim that workers may not derive welfare from
accumulation goods. However, on the one hand, this does not respond to
cases such as perfect complements or lexicographic preferences. On the
other hand, to postulate that “workers have some preference for accumu-
lation goods if they - even unconsciously - have some ideas about a desirable
production allocation in the society” ([6], p.263) is arguably rather ad hoc
and objectionable. And it implies that an approach that aims to provide a
general theory of exploitation, which is robust to counterexamples, ultimately
rests on a purely empirical assumption.
A third critique of the subjectivist approach to exploitation theory is
developed in the following example:
19Example 1: Consider the following von Neumann production technology


































proﬁtr a t eπ = 1





yields a proﬁtr a t eπ0 =0 .M o r e o v e r ,
[B − A]x = bLx and Ax 5 ω.F i n a l l y ,pb =1 .
Insert Figure 1 around here.






2. It follows that b =a r gm a x py0=1 u(y0).
Thus, if u is interpreted as representing standard subjective preferences over
consumption (as in the neoclassical theory of consumer behavior), the vector
b can be interpreted as the worker’s Marshallian demand which is purchased
under the budget constraint py0 =1 . In contrast, it follows from Deﬁnition
4t h a tαu
0 (b)=Le x =
√
2







,a n du(b)=u(e y)







. Hence, since 1 − Le x>0, according to
Deﬁnition 4, the worker is exploited w.r.t. u.
However, the socially necessary labour Le x of the worker is given as the
minimal amount of labour necessary to produce the consumption vector e y.
Then, the worker can never purchase this vector with her income, since
pe y = 3
4
√
2 > 1. This is strange, because the socially necessary labour of the
worker has to be regarded as the labour hours necessary to produce some
commodity vector which the worker can purchase by her wage revenue per
period. However, in the case of Deﬁnition 4, the labour Le x is necessary to
produce a non-purchasable consumption vector e y. To purchase the vector e y
with the worker’s income at p, she needs to earn 3
4
√
2 per period, which is
impossible because the upper bound on labour supply per period is one.
The fourth, and arguably strongest, objection to the subjectivist approach
relates to the core feature of the approach, namely the deﬁnitional role played
20by subjective preferences. Even though, as shown by Theorem 1, the exis-
tence of exploitation may be unaﬀected by the speciﬁcc h o i c eo f(uν)ν∈W
within U, both the individual and a fortiori the aggregate rate of exploita-
tion (and thus the intensity of exploitation) in general are not. As already
noted, for example, if workers are heterogeneous, there is no obvious way of
deﬁning an aggregate exploitation index. More strongly, even if a represen-
tative agent is assumed so that uν = u for all ν ∈ W, the solution of the
individual minimisation problem MLν above, and thus the actual value of b
and any index on the intensity of exploitation that is based on it, will depend
on the speciﬁc utility function chosen. The next Theorem provides a precise
formal statement of the conditions under which this claim holds and of the
potential indeterminacy of a subjectivist index of exploitation.
Theorem 4: Assume Axiom 2. Consider the subset of economies Eu ⊂ E,
such that for any E ∈ Eu and any ν ∈ W, uν = u.T h e n :
(i) For any E ∈ Eu, αu
0 (b)=l for all u ∈ U if and only if {b} = S b P (α0 = l).
(ii) There exists an economy E ∈ Eu, such that for all δ > 0 and all ε ∈ [0,1]
there is a function u ∈ U,s u c ht h a t|eu(b,l) − ε| < δ.
Proof. Part (i). First of all, note that if {b} = S b P (α0 = l) then for all α0 ∈
P, such that α0
0 5 α0 = l, b α
0 5 b α = b and if α0 6= α,t h e nb α
0 ≤ b α. But then,
it immediately follows from Assumption 4 that αu
0 (b)=l for all u ∈ U.C o n -
v e r s e l y ,s u p p o s et h a tt h e r ee x i s tb0 6= b : {b,b0} ⊂ S b P (α0 = l).B yd e ﬁnition,
it follows that there exist at least two entries i,j such that b0
i >b i and b0
j <b j.
Furthermore, by the convex cone property of P, it follows that for all λ ∈
[0,1], e b = λb +( 1− λ)b0 ∈ S b P (α0 = l). Then, deﬁne the following subset of
utility functions in U: Up = {u ∈ U : u(c)=
Pn
i=1 δici,δi > 0,
Pn
i=1 δi =1 }.
It is immediate to show that there always exists u ∈ Up such that u(e b) >u (b),
for all e b = λb +( 1− λ)b0, λ ∈ (0,1], and therefore αu
0 (b) <l .
Part (ii). Consider the following von Neumann production technology




























constitute a reproducible solution associated with the maximal
21proﬁtr a t eπ = 1





implies π0 = −1
2 and
thus, by the convex cone property of P the maximal proﬁtr a t ei si n d e e d
π = 1
2. Further, Ax = ω, (B − A)x ≥ b, Lx =1 ,a n dpb =1 . Then, as in
part (i), consider the subset of utility functions
U
p = {u ∈ U : u(c)=δc1 +( 1− δ)c2,1 > δ > 0}.
Deﬁne an inﬁnite sequence of functions {ut(c)}
∞
t=0 in Up as follows:
u
t(c)=δ
tc1 +( 1− δ
t)c2,w h e r eδ
t ∈ (0,1)
for all t.N o t et h a t ,b yA x i o m2 ,eu(b,1) = 1−αu
0 (b). Therefore, let eut(b,1) =
1 − αut
0 (b): it is immediate to prove that as δt → 0, αut
0 (b) → 1, and thus
eut(b,1) → 0,w h e r e a sa sδt → 1, αut
0 (b) → 0,a n dt h u seut(b,1) → 1.
In other words, even if workers are identical, and thus no aggregation issue
arises, the exploitation index will be invariant to changes in workers’ pref-
erences only in the rather special case that there exists a certain amount of
labour input such that the wage basket lies on the corresponding production
possibility frontier, and the latter corresponds to a single point. By focusing
on a simple von Neumann technology, the following example forcefully illus-
trates the implications of Theorem 4, if the condition in Part (i) is violated,









, (ων)ν∈K =( ω0ν)ν∈K,b u teu(b,l) 6= eu0(b,l).





in Example 1. Let uν = u for all ν ∈ W,a n du ∈ U b eg i v e na si nE x a m p l e














Insert Figure 2 around here.
In other word, U (b;u) ) U (b;u0). In this case, b =a r gm a x py0=1 u0 (y0) holds.
Thus, if we interpret u0 as representing a standard subjective preference of
the worker over consumption such as in the neoclassical theory of consumers
behavior, the vector b can be interpreted as the worker’s Marshallian demand
which is purchased under the budget constraint py0 =1 ,a sa r g u e di nE x a m p l e
221. However, now, αu0
0 (b)=Le x0 >
√
2
2 holds, since by the construction of u0,







,s ot h a te y0 ≡ [B − A]e x0 > e y.N o t ee v e ni n
this case, 1 − Le x0 > 0 still holds, and so the worker is exploited w.r.t. u0,
since b ∈ b P(A,B,L) (Lx =1 )\S b P(A,B,L) (Lx =1 )and u0 ∈ U. Hence, though
this worker is under the same working condition as in Example 1, because
she provides one unit of labour and receives one unit of wage revenue per day,
her ‘exploitation rate’ would decrease if her subjective preference is changed
from u to u0.
To be sure, a supporter of the subjectivist approach may object that,
after all, the main purpose of exploitation theory is to diagnose the exis-
tence of exploitation, whereas the construction of an exploitation index is
not essential. This defence is arguably unconvincing: ﬁrst, as shown in the
previous section, even focusing on the issue of the existence of exploitation,
in the subjectivist approach exploitation may exist even if proﬁts are zero.
Second, this defence implies that it is impossible to compare diﬀerent so-
cieties based on the amount of exploitation suﬀered by the working class,
nor is it meaningful to analyse the dynamics of exploitation of a society
over time. Actually, Theorem 4(ii) has an even more puzzling implication:
even assuming workers to be identical, there exists economies in which it is
literally impossible in principle to say anything about exploitation, except
whether it exists. In fact, for a given set of objective characteristics of the
economy, the amount of exploitation suﬀered by workers can take any value if
the appropriate continuous and strictly increasing utility function is chosen.
In other words, by simply changing workers’ subjective preferences, the econ-
omy moves from being essentially non-exploitative, to being plagued by the
most extreme form of exploitation. In this kind of situation, the exploitation
index is not just inaccurate, it is meaningless.10
10It is worth noting in passing that Matsuo defends his subjectivist approach by arguing
that “exploitation is a matter of alienation” ([6], p.263), that is, it derives from the workers’
“exclusion from decision making on the production allocation of the society” ([6], p.263).
This argument seems false, for in Matsuo’s framework, exploitation would be eliminated if
capitalists continued to organise production but workers received the whole of net product.
It is also arguably misleading, if not conceptually inappropriate, to conﬂate two distinct
phenomena.
236 An objectivist approach to exploitation
In the previous sections, a thorough critical analysis of the subjectivist ap-
proach to exploitation is developed. The main criticism is not that a sub-
jectivist approach is not consistent with Marx’s own theory (although it is
arguably not), but rather that it has a number of undesirable, if not counter-
intuitive properties. In this section, an alternative, objectivist approach to
exploitation is proposed, which provides more satisfactory answers to some of
the key questions of exploitation theory, such as the construction of a robust
index of exploitation, and which preserves the FMT in general economies.
There are a number of ways to deﬁne objectivism in the context of the
general convex economies analysed in this paper. To be sure, it may be ar-
gued that all possible inﬂuences, direct and indirect, of subjective preferences
and even individual choices should be excluded in the analysis of exploita-
tion. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is unnecessary to adjudicate
competing views of objectivism, and the following axiom aims to capture
the minimum common denominator of all objectivist approaches, by requir-
ing that if all the objective features of two economies are identical, their
exploitation indices should also be identical, regardless of agents’ subjective
preferences.
Axiom 3 (Objectivism): Let E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki and
E0 = hK0,W0;(u0ν)ν∈W ;(P0,b 0);(ω0ν)ν∈Ki, be such that K = K0, W =









for all (uν)ν∈W and (u0ν)ν∈W.
Note that Axiom 3 implies that the exploitation index is invariant with re-
spect to all utility functions, and therefore a fortiori with respect to utility
functions in U.
Though there may be a number of deﬁnitions satisfying Axiom 3, this pa-
per analyses a speciﬁcp r o po s a l .G i v e na ne c o n o m yE = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki,
let α ∈ P be a social production point such that b α ∈ Rn
+ and let p ∈ Rn
+
b et h ea s s o c i a t e dp r i c ev e c t o rt h a tp r e v a i l si nt h ee c o n o m y . L e tB (p,b) ≡ ©
c ∈ Rn
+ | pc = pb
ª
: B (p,b) is the set of bundles that cost exactly as much
a st h ew a g eb u n d l eb. Then, let us take c ∈ B (p,b) such that c = tb α for some
t>0.D e n o t es u c ht>0 by t(p,α). In this section, the following deﬁnition of
exploitation is analysed.
Deﬁnition 7: For any E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki,l e tα ∈ P be
24a social production point such that b α ∈ Rn
+ and let p ∈ Rn
+ be the associ-
ated price vector prevailing in this economy. Then, every worker ν ∈ W is
exploited if and only if 1 − t(p,α)α0 > 0.
There are a number of properties of Deﬁnition 7 that are worth stress-
ing. First, Deﬁnition 7 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’
developed by Duménil [1] and Foley [3]. In fact, t(p,α) can be interpreted as
t h ev a l u eo fl a b o u rp o w e r ,w h i c hc o i n c i d e sw i t ht h ew a g er a t e( n o r m a l i s e d
by net national product). Therefore, as in the New Interpretation, work-
ers are exploited if and only if the share of wages in national income is less
than one. Second, it is immediate to show that it satisﬁes Axiom 3: once
prices and the aggregate social production vector are known, t(p,α) and the
exploitation rates (individual and aggregate) are identiﬁed, independently of
preferences. Third, in the general convex economies considered in this pa-
per, the deﬁnition of the aggregate index of exploitation is straightforward





=1−t(p,α)α0. The latter index is well-deﬁned and uniquely
determined, for any set of objective characteristics of the economy, which al-
lows meaningful comparisons across time and between countries concerning
exploitation, and - more generally - fruitful empirical analysis in a Marxian
context.11 Fourth, as shown in [22], it is possible to provide a complete ax-
iomatic characterisation of Deﬁnition 7 in the context of general convex cone
subsistence economies with optimising agents: in such context, Deﬁnition 7
surprisingly emerges as the unique deﬁnition of exploitation that satisﬁes a
small set of rather weak axioms.12
Finally, the objectivist approach in Deﬁnition 7 preserves all the essential
insights of the subjectivist approach, but it also allows for the extension of
the FMT to general convex cone economies. Thus, under Deﬁnition 7, the
equivalent of Theorem 1 can be proved.
Theorem 5 (The General System of an Objectivist Exploitation Theory):
For any economy E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki ∈ E, the following
statements are equivalent:
(1) b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) ;
11For a detailed discussion of the empirical implications of the ‘New Interpretation,’ see
[7].
12See [20] for an axiomatic analysis of Deﬁnition 7 in the context of accumulating
economies.
25(2) @p ∈ Rn
++ s.t. p[b α − b] 5 0 holds for any b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) ;
(3) For any α ∈ P (α0 =1 )such that b α ≥ b,a n df o ra n yp ∈ Rn
++ ,
1 − t(p,α)α0 > 0 holds.
Proof. By Theorem 1, it suﬃces to show (1)⇔(3). First, suppose that (1)
holds. Then, there exists α ∈ P (α0 =1 )such that b α ≥ b.T a k e a n y s u c h
α. Then, for any p ∈ Rn
++ , pb α >p b= pc for any c ∈ B (p,b).T h u s , f o r
t(p,α)b α ∈ B (p,b), pb α >p·t(p,α)b α, which implies 1−t(p,α)α0 > 0,s i n c eα0 =1 .
Next, suppose that (1) does not hold. Then, there is no α ∈ P (α0 =1 )
such that b α ≥ b, so that (3) trivially holds.
As in the case of Theorem 1, though, Theorem 5 does not provide fully
satisfactory answers to some core issues of exploitation theory. This is be-
c a u s ei ts a y sn o t h i n ga b o u tp r o ﬁt and exploitation in the case with p ≥ 0,
even though it is certainly conceivable that in a market equilibrium the price
vector is such that p ≥ 0 and there is no obvious reason to focus solely on
strictly positive price vectors. Fortunately, in contrast to the subjectivist
view, if Deﬁnition 7 is adopted, the FMT does hold in general convex cone
economies, as shown by the next two results.
Theorem 6 (FMT in BGEs): For any economy E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki
∈ E with P = P(A,B,L),l e t((p,1),x,π) be a BGE.T h e n ,π > 0 if and only
if every worker is exploited in the sense of Deﬁnition 7.
Proof. Let π > 0. Then, pBx − [pA + L]x>0. Without loss of generality,
let x be normalized so that Lx =1holds. Then, given pb =1 ,t h ea b o v e
inequality is reduced to p[B − A]x>p b= t(p,x)p[B − A]x for some t(p,x) >
0.S i n c et(p,x) < 1, 1 − t(p,α)Lx > 0 holds, so that every worker is exploited
in terms of Deﬁnition 7.
Let π 5 0.T h e n ,pBx−[pA + L]x 5 0. Again, given Lx =1and pb =1 ,
p[B − A]x 5 pb = t(p,x)p[B − A]x for some t(p,x) > 0.S i n c e t(p,x) = 1,
1 − t(p,α)Lx 5 0 holds, so that every worker is not exploited in terms of
Deﬁnition 7.
In other words, Theorem 6 proves that, unlike in the subjectivist ap-
proach, under Deﬁnition 7, the FMT holds if von Neumann’s equilibrium
concept is adopted. This result makes Deﬁnition 7 at least equivalent to
Morishima’s ([9]) classical deﬁnition, from the viewpoint of preserving the
general relation between exploitation and proﬁts. Unlike the latter approach,
26though, under Deﬁnition 7, the Marxian postulate that exploitation is syn-
onimous with positive proﬁts holds even if other equilibrium concepts are
adopted, as shown by the next result.
Theorem 7 (FMT in RSs): For any economy E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ki











0 > 0 if
and only if every worker is exploited in the sense of Deﬁnition 7.
Proof. Let α ≡
P
ν∈K αν and let α0 ≡ α













0 S 0 ⇔ pb α
0 − 1 S 0.
First, suppose that pb α
0 − 1 > 0. Then, since pb =1 , it follows that
pb α
0 >p b= t(p,α0)pb α
0,f o rs o m et(p,α0) > 0. Because t(p,α0) < 1, it follows that
1 − t(p,α0)α0
0 > 0, so that every worker is exploited in terms of Deﬁnition 7.
Next, if pb α
0 − 1=0 ,t h e ni nas i m i l a rw a y ,i tc a nb ep r o v e dt h a t1 −
t(p,α0)α0
0 =0 , so that no worker is exploited in the sense of Deﬁnition 7.
As argued above, Deﬁnition 7 has a number of attractive features that
warrant its adoption in the context of exploitation theory. Theorems 6 and
7 arguably provide further independent support to its adoption as the ap-
propriate deﬁnition of exploitation. In fact, if the epistemological role of
the FMT is indeed as a postulate, as assumed in much of the discussion on
the Marxian theory of exploitation (see the Introduction above), Theorems
6 and 7 show that Deﬁnition 7 is preferable to the main received deﬁnitions,
and to the subjectivist approach, because it allows to derive a general, robust
relation between exploitation and proﬁts.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyses two central issues in exploitation theory. First, the ap-
propriate deﬁnition of individual and aggregate measures of exploitation is
discussed. Second, the relation between proﬁts and exploitation (the so-called
Fundamental Marxian Theorem) is formally analysed. A general framework
for the analysis of exploitation in the context of convex cone economies is
27proposed and various alternative equilibrium concepts - such as von Neu-
mann’s Balanced Growth Equilibrium, and Roemer’s Reproducible Solution
- are discussed.
The limits of subjectivist approaches to exploitation, which crucially de-
pend on agents’ preferences, are shown. It is argued that in a subjectivist
approach, it may be possible to accurately identify the existence of exploita-
tion, but it is in general impossible to construct a reliable measure of its in-
tensity, which makes it diﬃcult to develop any meaningful empirical analysis
(both cross-section and time series) of existing economies from the viewpoint
of exploitation theory. Further, it is shown that in general the subjectivist
approach does not preserve the relation between proﬁts and exploitation that
characterises the Marxian theory of exploitation, for positive exploitation can
well coexist with zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
An o v e la x i o m a t i cd e ﬁnition of objectivist approaches to exploitation the-
ory is rigorously formulated. Then, a speciﬁco b j e c t i v i s td e ﬁnition of ex-
ploitation is proposed, which is related to the so-called ‘New Interpretation’
([1], [3]). A number of desirable properties of this deﬁnition are discussed,
which suggest that it captures the core intuitions of exploitation theory and
that it provides appropriate, and empirically meaningful, indices of individ-
ual and aggregate exploitation. Further, it is shown that under the deﬁnition
of exploitation proposed in this paper, the Fundamental Marxian Theorem
holds in general convex economies. Actually, as proved in [19] and [22],
if the approach presented in this paper is adopted, the FMT can be ex-
tended to subsistence economies (in which agents minimise labour, instead
of maximising revenues) and, in less polarised economies with a more com-
plex class structure, the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle ([13])
holds, which states that agents in the lower classes are exploited and agents
in the higher classes are exploiters. Indeed, as shown in [17], the deﬁnition
proposed in this paper can be meaningfully applied to the analysis of the
global economy and to fully dynamic economic models.
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